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Talk over NBC by Congressman Mike Mansfield on April 21, 191,4.
CHINA : J KEY TO VIC'X1RY

My f ellow Ame rie8ns:
This is my third radio t e.lk with you concerning the Far Evst ,
My purpos e in discussing this fi eld is to keep you informed about
wh2t is happ ening the re and to emphasize the importrnce of that are·a
in this global war,
You a r e all aware of our succ esses in the Pacific ove r the past
ye<J. r a nd we a r e justly proud of EcArthur, Halsey, Nimitz, Chenn<·ult ,
and S tilHell and the boys who fight unde r the ir commccnds . But their
job hes been a long nnd hard one and th e end is, a s yet, nowhe r e in
sight, Ue cannot nfford to beli eve those who s<:y thc: t Jnpan vli.ll b e
defeated before Gerlll1:ny, b e caus e there is absolutely no br:sis for
thet stateme nt , Neither should we be complacent about our success es
or &bout the size of our na vy or the fr:ct th2t we r:re building 12
wa rships every day - Sundays included ,
'it/hil e we are scraping th;; bottom of our manpower b<·rre l to
garrison ove r 50 fronts sca tte r ed <·11 over the world, the J a pa nese
ha ve a lmost 2 million men who have not b een c<lle d to the colors
b ec<us e th ey arE· not needed ,
In estim<ting our enemie s we must us e common s ense a nd look at
the m <:>s they r e< lly <'r e , Our be st milit a ry minds r e cognize the Je p a s
a first class fighting man , Yes, he ' s short in stature, his clothes
a r e ill-fitting, e.nd h e 's not much on th e pande ground , But, in the
fi eld he is tough, f nnatica l, <tnd hns <: do-or-di e spirit, · His equipment is good and he oc.n subsist on f<>r l ess than our boys, His
industrinl c<tpn city is f a r bett e r than we give him credit for e ven if,
in ouality and qua ntity, he l a gs behind, Th es e people, who are supposed
to b e only imit<,t ors, a r e todRy building single s eRt e r fighter planes
the. t fly in exc ess of 350 mil es <·n hour, thr.t h<:ve <• highE:r m<cn cuver.:-b ility than ours, a nd <1 r c: t e of climb th<'. t comp2.r c s well with our
planes.
Since Pe<rl Harbor, Japa.n has b ecome: the rich est m .tion in the
;mrld ?.nd hC's eve ry n.cturnl r esource need ed to carry on the war. She
can , if given time, become pe rhaps the most powerful mil i.tary n.o tion
the world hc:s eve r seen. J a prtn has no qu;olms ?bout using the 400 , 000,000
people it hes conqu erEd <l S r huge pool of subj ect 1< bor . She is
mobilize'i for a long wa r, h er peopl·e eat one third of ··1hnt they used to,
and every ene rgy is dire cte d toward th e killing of Allied soldj.c rs ,
Jap<n has l!k~de full us e of the limit ed initia l r e sourc es of a weak
nr·. tion and has fought a ca r e ful ~.nd orthodox war with two exceptions Midway <'lnd th r. fl ee t action a t Gu<d<'.lcanal , The JRpams e int e nd to
mRkc uB p<::y he<•. vily for every succ eBs we achieve and the ir d ef e nse, e:s
at Ta r awc, , New Guin e<<, a nd els ewhe r e , shows c<'reful pla nning ,
In fighting JRpan we must keep ope n th e longest supply line in
history, To illustr~ t e : it takes 44 ships, 3200 crewme n, and 165,000
barrels of oil to move 100,000 tons of suppli es to Jl.ustrali?. each month .
To move t hC' t amount by air would require over 10,000 pla n es, <!pprox:im2tely
120, 000 crewme n, nnd clos e: to 10, .000,000 barr els of gasolinA , And thESe
suppli es would be enough for c: n Army to wage a minor engage ment only ,
It is ev en more difficult to tr;cnsport supplies to our gre?.t Asi<J.tic
Ally, Chine- . Chinr, with its a lmost heclf ?. billion people born to the
oldest culture in the world, struggling, fighting, 2.nd dying to pre serve
her nc.tionhood, hi'.S b ee n in this weer for almost s e ven years. He r
mat e ri<i l conditions h< ve ch< nge d for thEe worsr, he r richest industrial
a r eas havE: been lost, widesprerd infl<t tion hc:s s e t in, her troops are
still inf'deauately e. rmed , but tad< y she is as confident of fin<cl victory
as evcro
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Ch.in11 will be the lll<"'cin front in th e Pacific •·t-r. Ev.:n i f the
JapFnes e Navy is meeting its match, this c«rmot Y'- t be sr.id of the encey
Army, entrenched in a w .st l <.nd dom<in fr o:n .!<:.nchttri<' to Burr:~: . hcccntly
two top Ame rican command ers hrve ~nphr.si z ed in sr-~cific te~s the nature
of the tnsk thc,t lies a hend on the continent of Asi<.. On Februnry 8,
Aclmir<l Ch(.st er I. Nimitz told news pr.permcn: ~~~~y obj(.ctivc is to get
ground and air forc es into China ns soon ~s possible. I don't believe
J"lpt:n c<>n be defa t e d from the s e<> <: lon e ." To this he addt;d the
unequivoc<l decl<r<' tion: "I b elieve J a pa n ca n be defc<:.ted only from
bases in China."
Five d a~ late r, Lieute nant Gent r Pl Jos eph 11. Stilwell decl~rcd
that Admiral Nimitz 1 s n< val drive t- cross the Pacific to the China c:>.,st
"Must be supporte d her vily by r.n flggressive Allied l<nd a nd au offensive
proj pct ::d from the interior • 11 J,.ss e rting th.:ct "vit a l China-based < :'.r
oper rt ions cannot wa it for '' pen etration of the blockrde by lar.c or Sl.':"
he stat<:d th<'t f <cilities e.r e be ing prepr r e d insid e Chin.:· to s~r · •icc.
"the J.a:::-~;est nnd newest cargo carrie rs availnblc. 11
All sea c.nd overl and routes to Chin<' - with one exc ept i c:1
< .. ~
cut off. The one. exception is the Northwes t Crr<.vi'! n Route fro m 5,i:1::ta.·g
Provinc e into China proper. At th e pre s ent time n ?gotiations o r e b" •.r'
carried on b ctwel. n Chine. and Russi< concerning the tra ns port<ttion o.f
supplies from the U.S.S.R. via this route but no r: greement hccs, ns yt:::
b e>en r eached.
The only route now is an r.eria l one ove r the "Hump" of the
Himalayas, and th er e th e Amy Air Transport Command c-.nd the Chin< N<ttional
Avia tion Corpor<ttion nre doing a r ema rkEbly e ffici ent job. ·1h en China
first proposed this route to our <:uthoritiss she was told th<•t the
mount<>ins were impc>.ssnblc , the India n monsoons impene tr<>bl e , and when
skies were cl ear JapAne se inte rception would become f<ct a l. All thes e
factors hrve been overcome a. nd tod2y more mat<cria l is be ing flown into
Chin& thc,n ever went in over th e Bun!l<'. ho ad.
Every item of equipment n " c es sary for th e l!li'tintenance And
operc>.tion of Chenna ult 1 s c-. ir forc e in China must b e flown in from the
outsid e . This is the fundame ntol f a ct of our stre.t egy in Chinn . Transport
pla n es flying the r ound trip b etwee n Ass am a nd Kunming ~~ n delive r four
tons of 100 octane gRs, but to do so they must th ems elve s us c 3~ tons of
th ·~ pre cious commodity.
It is no S<cret that many pl~nes flying ove r the !lump hiwe b een
lost without trrcce . In th e last e ight months of 1942 - when transport&tion
ove r the Hillkllayt.s bega n - more the.n a fourth of the pla n es us ed were
wrecked, shot do1'm, or destroy ed . 1'oda~·, the flights go forwa rd on
schedul e , rnd until such time c>.s we ca n either cepture a seaport on the
China coast or we con~uer Burm2 to permit opening a nother overlr nd route
to Chin<~ , this rout e is of the gre<. t es t import<once nnd to dnte is all
we h2>ve~
We co n control the nir compl etely; we can sweep th e. s eas clean;
but e ven then, we will be a long w<·y from winning our war in the Prcific .
This wrr vnll be decided by the bRyonet &nd the rifle, and th<lt meens
the infantryTMn will ca.rry the burden . Thc;t is where Chin<. comes in
becnus e she has the llk,npower and th e will to us e it . China's army hc>.B
been trained well in the us e of smr.ll arms - th e rifl e c;.nd the m< chine
gun . She hns the experience and thE stra t e gic location . This wc..r may
end !!21 with the conQJUest of Jppan 1 s Pacific holdinGS or e ven with the
defe2t and conque st of Japon itself. It may very likely e nd in !ianchuria
where this war ste.rted in 1931 and it is the re tha t memmoth lnnd armies
may well decide this , barbaric struggle .
For this reason - and it is not so for fetch ed as some mry think Chine must be given every possible assistence <nd soon . lfuil e we hevc not
given her all the supplie s she: needs, we heve bee n mccking superhuman
efforts ilnd the results ere only now beginning to t e ll. In the l as t
eight months of 1942 we s ent in over the Hump - 5500 tons of 11kl1:.erial by
Rir and in 1943 vre rais ed the.t to 63 ,000 t"ns of "hic"J 1_3 30n ~c"ls wer r-

-3-

flown in the month of December alone , This shows r enerkable progress
and some day when the history of the a ir f erry from India to Chimt is
known, this country will r ei1lize tha t ther e e> r 12 no gre<.t er heroes in
this war th<>n the boys who fly the big tr<' nspo rts ove r the Hil'lal<:yas,
The r esult no>~ is onl y <. trickl e but when th e Ledo roed is compl<;ted
2nd the Burm<> Ro ad r eo pened it will swell end when we conquer our first
seapo rt on the Chin< coc> st it will be come f\ torrent,
Be for ? this happen s the Chin ese <· nd Ameriec"tnS will hc.ve to
continue to fight <nd fly should er to should er, ~·h e Chines e do not wish
t o mekc the wa r in .Asi<: e>n America n burd en but would r <· th er that Ame rica
give them the tools so th<•t they could do the job,
To imple ment tr~m s port a tion into China , th er e is b e ing und ert a ken a t pr esent the building of the Ledo Ro<, d from Ass<.m in Indi~ through
northern Bur ma towa rd the Chinese frontier, About 150 miles ha ve cc.lready
b ee n built a nd, if v1e C<• n capture Hyitkine , 2. J 01panes e held r a ilroc. d
t er minus in northern Burma befor e the monsoon r a ins begin in May, the
road should be compl et ed by next f a ll or winter and <•nother highway into
China made " r eality, Then, in conjunction with the "RUlli>" we shou}.d be
Elb l ~ to s end in material e nough to start to drive the Japs out of Chinn.
Gener <d Joe Stilwell des erves all th e credit in th e v..o rld for hi3
for es ight in building th e Ledo Road, The Americc. n-Chin cs e forc es a r e
working tog ether a nd doing a great job. The finishing touches will come
wh en th e strength-starved China th eatre gets th<.' ships, pla n es, Bnd men
to ~~k e it possible , Befor e this c~n b e accomplish9d the J a panes e
inva sion of India - a nd it is e s erious threa t - must b e thrown ba ck,
If Auchinle ck a nd Mountbatten do not stop the J a pccnes e, the supply routes
f or the Ledo Road will be cut a nd a ll our tra nsport and ground operations
in Ass am a nd No rth Burma will b e da nge rously menaced .
The Cairo Declaration wa s on e of the first indica tions tha t this
country and Engl i' nd <'- t l c> st r ealized the full import of the situ<. tion in
th s F,or J:.ast . Unlike the Te her a n Conferenc e , which was mostly, if not
entir ely, occupied with European p robl ems, the Ca iro de clur co.tion stat e d
that J apan must surrend er unconditionally, Furthe rmor e , it stated that
Manchuria, Formos.o. , a nd the Pesca dor es shell b e r estore d to China . These
state me nts or promis es mean much to Chin<' El nd th e far East but they do
not s ettl ~ a ll th e questions concerning t erritory which she considers a nd rightly so -hers, No mention is made of the r eturn of Hongkong and
Kowloon by Engl a nd, of Maca o by Portugal, of Kwangchow-wa n by Fra nce , or
of Outer ;.,I ongolia a nd 'l 'a nnu Tuva by th e U,S,S,R. Thes e ar e Lhin es e
t erritori es and should b e r eturn ed to Chin<' at the earli est possible
momen t. ;ye a r e not fighting this we r to bring <·bout th e r eturn of the
status quo a nt e in the F8 r East, To do so would only mean another wa r
in the futur e . China is not fighting for t e rritorial aggr a ndiz eme nt, but
she is det e r mined to r eacquir e th e lands which have been t a ken awEy from
he r by force ,
The Cairo DeclE. ration was significant not so much for wh&t it
s aid but for what it l eft uns ~id . It touch ed on J apa ne s e imperialism; it
said nothing of the Occidenta l typ e ,
Host peopl e in this country think that a fter G.:rmany•s fall
Japan's punishment will logiccc lly and ine vita bly follow, That assumption
is correct but it is not sha r ed by th e military clique which rulPs Japa n
e ven though we ha ve sunk ove r 500 ships of he r merchant fl eet through th e
work of our sub1112rine s; even t hough we produce over 9,000 pl<n es B month
to h er 1, 000 ; ev ,,n t hough our t a nk a nd ship production is grec• t e r than
he rs; a nd even thoug h we ex ercis e complet e control of the mid, southwest,
and north l'<> cific s ea and sky lan")S,
J<tpen bel i e ves that in a f ew yea rs she c<.n corre ct her present
c 'liC-or.t v:eaknesses if she is not s eri ously harass ed by us, J.nd sh E: is
c ~rL' ~r.:'..y :1ot being s e riously hurt, exc ept on th e oute r fr'.ng e of te r
c·.tr, J _'\~-.~ at rh-:l moment . .
The Jc?.ps thln~( L.h~t we wi1_ :1_ ·. . -c:r\"mt. ''{l_:.cy· <..fa-y:_ . . .
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tha t docs not dir" ctly r. ff e ct our shor os <nd t tu t our p·:opl e will
e ventua lly insist upon < conpromis < pea ce l e< vinr, J a p<.n with th ~ grea t e r
part of he r pres ent g~ ins. This would we ll suit Tojo b ~ c ~ us & it would
f' llow J 11 p<'n to consolid<' t " h<. r ga ins a nd exploit t.h u~ to th e lir.li.t " t
which til'l.: sh.:: 11ould resume h( r a dva nce townrd world mnste ry.
How lonp, c< n Jr. pa n hold out? Tht: Jnps think for J vc r. They r, r e
wrong. Too m«nl' America ns think for only a f ew months or <• y e<•r a t the
most . They a re wrong, too. lvo one can a nswe r the <lue stion, but e vJryon e
can be assured th< t it will require e very ounce of our e ne rgy and <' bility
to do th ~ job, <.nd t he1 t applFs to the rn<.n on the f <rm, th e worke r in
the r e ctory, the l egisl.:•tors in ,;C\shington, and the boys .:·t the front.
The Japa nes E- say we will not me.ke e.ny Sf'crific es e nd th ey emphasiz e
our "softness". They look upon us ~ s weaklings, th ey play up our
disunity, end they question our fighting spirit. They think a ll th es e
elements will give them time to obtain complete control of a ll the ir
conquests. They he\ve ITI<!de no provision for f nilure , ,,nd th ey f eel th e
American people will give in when the going gets re.:.lly tough .
Will we? The answer is no, becr:us e we likewis E' h<:1ve nk'1d e no provision
for f.:•ilure.
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